Don’t trust satellite phones – The GMR-1 and GMR-2 ciphers have been broken [UPDATE]
Today, February 2nd 2012, Benedikt Driessen and Ralf Hund gave a very interesting talk at Ruhr Universität Bochum about their work on satellite phone security. In a nutshell, they were able to reverse engineer and to break the secret ciphers used in many satellite phone systems, namely the GMR-1 and the GMR-2 ciphers.
What are satellite phones?
We all know cell phones, also known as GSM, UMTS or 3G phones. These phones communicate with their network operators stations. Usual ranges are a few hundred meters in a city, or up to 40 kilometers in very sparsely populated areas. In many countries in Europe, there is like 99% coverage, so that it is hard to find a place outside with no network coverage. Of course, cell phones tend not to work in tunnels or basements, but outside, the network coverage is usually fine.
There are many countries in the world like the United States of America, Russia or China, with many underpopulated areas, without any network coverage. Also there is no network coverage on the oceans and in many third world countries. But there is a solution, phones communicating with a satellite instead of a ground station can be used there.
How do satellite phones differ?
All phones in Germany use a common standard, and phones can usually be used on different networks, like the O2, Vodafone, E-plus or T-Mobile network. In contrast to that, there are also many different providers in the United States, but they use different systems. For example AT&T and T-Mobile USA are running GSM networks, but Sprint uses a different system, so that you can’t use your T-Mobile phone on the Sprint network. Also for satellite phones, there are many different standards.
A very common standard made by ETSI is GMR-1, which is used by Thuraya and many more operators. The GMR-1 specifications, except for the encryption algorithms are public and available on http://www.etsi.org/. Like many systems maintained by ETSI, GMR-1 uses a proprietary stream cipher cipher, that is not available to the public. Another standard for satellite phones is GMR-2, which is used by Immarsat. Again, a proprietary stream cipher is used for encryption.
GMR-1 and GMR-2 ciphers have been reverse engineered
A few days ago, it was announced that the GMR-1 and GMR-2 ciphers have been reverse engineerd. From the announcement:
…The first main contribution is that we were able to completely reverse engineer the encryption algorithms employed. Both ciphers had not been publicly known previously. We describe the details of the recovery of the two algorithms from freely available DSP-firmware updates for satphones, which included the development of a custom disassembler and tools to analyze the code, and extending prior work on binary analysis to efficiently identify cryptographic code. We note that these steps had to be repeated for both systems, because the available binaries were from two entirely different DSP processors…
Just that a cipher has been reverse engineered and is now public is not an indication for any kind of weakness of the cipher. Many popular encryption systems, like SSL/TLS that is used for online banking use cryptographic algorithms that are known to the public and have never been designed as closed source systems. In fact, one of the golden rules in cryptography, known as “Kerckhoffs’s principle” states that the security of a system should never be based on keeping the system private. Instead it should just be based on keeping the secret keys used in the system private.
The reverse engineering of GMR-1 has been done by disassembling firmware updates for the Thuraya SO-2510 phone. Most modern phones consist of 2-3 different processors. A main CPU for all the applications and the graphics and the user interface. Another CPU (DSP) is mostly responsible for signal processing and speech coding, and some very low level parts are implemented in dedicated hardware. Because the market for satellite phones is quiet small compared the GSM market, it is usually cheaper to implement these stream ciphers in software on the DSP, instead of hardware, so that standard chips with a custom firmware can be used, instead of a more expensive custom chip design. If a firmware can be extracted from the chip, or is available as a firmware update, this also eases the reverse engineering of these encryption algorithms. For the for the Thuraya SO-2510, the stream cipher has been found inside the DSP code, but not on the ARM host code. Here, a Texas Instruments C55x DSP was used.
Because one may assume, that these stream ciphers are similar to the GSM ciphers, they decided to search through the dissembled DSP code, and look for functions using a lot of XOR and shift operations. These two instructions are mainly used for bit manipulations when implementing linear feedback shift registers in software, but are not so common in none crypto code.
To reverse GMR-2, a Immarsat IsaPhonePro was used. Again, the firmware was analyzed, and the code for a Blackfin DSP was extracted. Surprisingly, the reverse engineered GMR-2 cipher is very different from GMR-1, and also very different from any cipher used in GSM or DECT. Instead of bits, the cipher operates on 8 bit registers (byte-registers). Also surprisingly, two S-Boxes from DES are used in this cipher.
Attacks on GMR-1 and GMR-2 are possible
The GMR-1 cipher is very similar to A5/2, 4 LFSRs are used, but the clocking is only controlled by a single register R4. As a result, one can even use ciphertext only attacks against GMR-1, which means only valid cipher texts are required for the attack. This type of attack is much more powerful than just a known plaintext attack, because it works with any kind of ciphertext, even without knowing the plaintext. This is possible, because there are parity checks inside the plaintext, that reveal the structure of the encrypted plaintext. The attack is similar to the attack described in http://cryptome.org/gsm-crack-bbk.pdf. The whole attack can be executed in less than 30 minutes on a standard PC.
For GMR-2, a known-plaintext attack is possible. In a nutshell, with a certain probability, some bits of the keystream will only be generated from Bytes 0 and 4 of the key. One can observe many keystreams and come up with a highly likely hypothesis for these two bytes of the key, and do a brute force search on the remaining key bytes. In total, keystreams from 5-6 frames (50-65 bytes of the keystream) are required to come up with a good hypothesis. After this, they key can be recovered within a second on a standard PC. However, so far it is unknown how difficult it is, to recover plaintexts.
UPDATE: The full paper is now available: http://gmr.crypto.rub.de/paper/paper-1.pdf